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RECENT CASES
COTENANCY-LIABILrTY OF OCCUPYING COTENANT FOR RENTAL VALUE. Defendant while married to the mother of the plaintiffs bought two houses.
The wife died and plaintiffs by inheritance from the wife became tenants
in common with defendant. The defendant occupied the "big house" and
rented the other. Plaintiffs at no time demanded or were denied the right
to occupy. From a decree for plaintiffs in an action for partition and for
an accounting, defendant appealed. Held for plaintiff, that the occupying
cotenant should be charged with the reasonable rental value of the premises occupied and must account to his cotenants for their share of that
rental value. McKnight and King v. Basilides and Allison, 19 Wn. (2d)
391, 143 P. (2d) 307 (1943). Petition for rehearing denied Dec. 11, 1943.
The general rule quoted by the court from 62 C. J. 446, "One tenant
in common who occupies all or more than his proportionate share of the
common premises is not liable because of such occupancy alone to his
cotenant or cotenants for rent or for use and occupation" is rejected by
the court because "it is not an equitable one," Id. 19 Wn. (2d) 391 at 404.
143 P. (2d) 307 at 315.
The Statute 4 Anne, c. 16, § 27 (1705) which extended the common
law beyond the bailiff relationship in giving one tenant in common or
joint tenant the remedy of account against the other has been construed
in England and most American courts to give an action only for a share
of rents and profits actually received from third persons. Washington has
followed this construction; e.g., Leake v. Hayes, 13 Wash. 213, 222, 43
Pac. 48, 50 (1895), "If appellants are liable at all for use and occupation,
or rents and profits, their liability did not arise until after demand was
made therefor by the respondent"; see also Santmeyer v. Clemmanes, 147
Wash. 354, 266 Pac. 148 (1928); Crodle v. Dodge, 99 Wash. 121, 168 Pac.
986 (1917).
A small minority of jurisdictions deciding contrary to the general rule
base their decision on a broad interpretation of their property statutes.
See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, 349 Ill. 642, 183 N. E. 13 (1932), in which the
Illinois statute (Revised Statutes of Illinois 1845, c. 2, § 1) similarly
worded to the Statute of Anne is given a more liberal interpretation.
Other courts feel that in order to reach an equitable decision an accounting must be made. Gage v. Gage, 66 N. H. 282, 29 Atl. 543 (1890). In
regard to mining property held by tenants in common, an accounting has
usually been ordered because the mineral products are part of the land
itself and removing the products or not operating the land is considered a
diminution of the estate. Note (1911) 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 224, 226; accord,
Harrigan v. Lynch, 21 Mont. 36, 52 Pac. 642 (1898).
The decision in
Ayotte v. Nadueau, 32 Mont. 498, 81 Pac. 145 (1905), was based on mining
law although the liability involved the reasonable rental value of the
buildings on the property. Pennsylvania reached the same result because
of an express statute, Laws of Pa. June 24, 1895, No. 138, p. 237; PURDON'S
PA. STATUTES (1917), title 20, § 1284; Lancaster v. Flowers, 208 Pa. 199, 57
Atl. 526 (1904).
The reasoning of the majority view is that the cotenant has a right
to the use of the land, perhaps has made it productive by his labor, and
should not be compelled to divide his profits with another who does not
choose to exercise his own right of occupancy, 2 Tiffany, Real Property
(3d ed. 1939) § 450; as long as there is no ouster, the tenant in possession
is exercising a legal right to the occupancy and full enjoyment of the
premises, Comment (1937) 25 CALIF. L. REv. 203, 211; the presumption is
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that the cotenant enters with the consent of the other, and it logically
follows that he should not be liable merely because he exercises his legal
right to the use of the land since there is no relationship of landlord and
tenant, there is no legal basis upon which to base collection of rent,
Badger v. Holmes, 6 Gray 118 (M ass. 1856.)
Jurisdictions favoring the minority view claim that use of the property
by one cotenant alone would be an exercise of exclusive ownership over
it, Ayotte v. Nadueau, supra. (This might be argued as particularly true
where the property is susceptible to joint occupation.)
The Statute of
Anne, which was to remedy abuses arising because the common, law
did not provide for an accounting unless there was an actual bailiff
relationship, should be broadly construed to extend full protection to the
tenant out of possession, Clarke v. Clark, supra. The minority might
well argue that the tenant in possession should put all profits into account
because the property should be used for the joint profit of the owners;
that the tenant in possession must be presumed to be acting for the
ownership as a whole because of the strong community of interest.
The Washington court states in the McKnight case that In re Foster's
Estate, 139 Wash. 224, 246 Pac. 290 (1926); Daniel v. Daniel, 106 Wash. 659,
181 Pac. 215 (1919), and Eckert v. Schmitt, 60 Wash. 23, 110 Pac. 635
(1910) are authority for the rule followed in the instant case. Analysis
shows, however, that these cases involve either a fiduciary relationship
or an actual element of hostility. If the rule of Leake v. Hayes is nevertheless overruled many unsolved points arise. After demand, under the
general rule, the tenant in possession improved at his own risk. Stephens
et ux. v. Taylor et. ux., 36 S. W. 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896). His liability
was determined on the basis of the land's value with improvements
balanced in the accounting by reimbursement for the improvements. Now
will the rental value be set at what it was at the time the tenancy in
common was created, or will it continually .increase as the tenant in
possession makes improvements? When one cotenant leases from another,
after expiration of the lease is he liable for the reasonable rental value
as in the instant case and Phillipsv. Smith, 214 Ala. 382, 107 So. 841 (1926),
or for rent at the terms set up by the lease as in Vichinich, v. Gordon, 124 P.
(2d) 868 (Cal. App. 1942)?
H. M. N.
EAsEmEms By IM IPLIcATIoN-REQUIsrrEs-ESTOPPEL. D sold P an unimproved lot in a subdivision which was originally entirely-owned by D,
who told P that the lot would be served with water from D's private
gravity system. P built his house and attached to the water system under
the land of his neighbor B, next door, with the consent of both B and D.
A dispute arose between P and B six years later, and B cut P's water
connection at the point between B's and P's lands. P then laid pipe
around B's lot and connected closer to the source of the water near D's
residence, interfering with D's supply. D cut this off, and P again connected closer to B's property. B cut this connection, P reconnected, 'and
sued to enjoin B and D from interfering with his water supply. At the
time of the trial, the land upon which the tank stood was owned by
another person. From a decree against B and D, D appeals. Held: Affirmed; an implied grant of an easement was found, D being estopped to
assert any difference between availability of water for use and actual use
(that is, he was estopped to claim that there was no use of the "easement") prior to severance, as a result-of the representations made by D
when he sold the lot to P. White v.Berg, 19 Wn. (2d) 294, 142 P. (2d)
260 (1943).
' Three things are regarded as essential to create an easement by
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implication; first 'a separation of title; second, that, before the separation takes place, the use which gives rise to the easement shall
have been so long continued and so obvious or manifest as to
show that it was meant to be permanent; and, third, that the easement shall be necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land
granted or retained.' 9 R.C.L. 757." Bailey v. Hennessey, 112 Wash.
45, 191 Pac. 863 (1920).
Also herein nominated as a controlling factor is the intent of the parties
at the time of the grant, which is presumed to exist from the presence
of these elements. Berlin v. Robbins, 180 Wash. 176, 38 P. (2d) 1047
(1934), is a case of an implied easement decided on the basis of these
three requirements alone, with no reference to the intent, as such, of the
parties. But the court in Rogers v. Cation, 9 Wn. (2d) 369, 115 P. (2d)
702 (1941), held that the intent or presumed intent of the parties is "the
prime factor," and that, citing Tiffany, Real Property, 3rd ed., § 780,
" . . . we should bear in mind that the rule is not a hard and
fast one, and the presence or absence of any or all of the stated
requirements is not necessarily conclusive."
However, the instant case seems to be based on neither of the above
principles; i. e., strict conformity to the three requirements, or the fulfillment of a missing requirement by the controlling intent of the parties.
Clearly lacking is the element of user of the water before severance;
and, although the intent of the parties was clear, the court did not base
its decision upon the holding of Rogers v. Cation, supra, which would
seem to have been the obvious solution of the problem. In the alternative, perhaps a conventional implied easement could have been found
upon the theory that the laying of the pipe itself was a sufficient user
before separation to satisfy the requirement; thus the land upon which
the tank is situated (apparently regarded by the court as the servient
estate) would have been adapted by installation of the water system
and the laying of pipes, and the dominant estate would also be adapted
to the user as completely as practical under the then conditions.
Estoppel is probably the basis for the doctrine of implied grants that
a grantor may not derogate from his own grant. See 17 Am. Jur., Easements § 33 at page 947; and Bailey v. Hennessey, supra. Thus, in the
instant case, we have what amounts to an estoppel to deny an estoppel to
deny a grant. But Cf. Cogswell v. Cogswell, 81 Wash. 315, 142 Pac. 655
(1914), citing Nicolas v. Chamberlain,2 Crokes, K. B. 121.
It will also be noted that D is not now the owner of the servient
estate, and his only interest in the proceedings seems to be that of a
user of the water supply. Consequently, the question arises whether the
above decision would be res judicata as to the now owner of the servient
estate. Possibly not, as the court may have meant here that the
estoppel ran against D to deny that P had what he, D, said P had, by
reason of representation at the time of sale and D's now negligible interest
in the subject matter of the suit.
The conception of implied grant is not favored at common law, (Ann.
Cas. 1913C, 1113) but it would seem that the reverse is true in this state.
At the present time, it appears that the requirements laid down in the
Bailey case have been the subject of two exceptions; first, by that in the
Rogers case that not all of the elements need be present if the intent be
clear, and, second, by that of the instant case that the grantor may be
estopped to assert the absence of one or more of the above requirements
by his representation at the time of sale to the effect that such an
easement does or would exist.
C. R. M.

